Mocking off car incentives that raise prices

In 2021, the government spent over a billion taxpayers minimizing the insane rush in car prices after already throwing out 600 million the year before, which had the same very marginal effect. This is the interpretation of car incentives in the light of the analysis of the value market mediated by the Fleet & Mobility Study Center. Other than stimulating citizens to switch cars to revive an industry to its knees. From the data, more than one of Penelope’s canvas emerges, where builders tear up their clothes to get incentives during the day and increase price lists and cut discounts at night. In 2021, the average net price of a new car went from 22,400 to 24,300 euros, which would have been 25,400 without a billion and fifty million incentives, obviously distributed on all volumes, as we are talking about average value. A little game made the year before: in 2019, the average net worth was 21,000 euros, which rose in 2020, yes during the pandemic, to 22,400, which without incentives would have been 22,800.

The study shows in its 16th edition with contributions from Dataforce, Mapfre and Texa, how the increase can be observed in all channels, from private individuals to rentals, only slightly more markedly in companies where there is no km0, generally on economic cars. The Italians, who in two years with the pandemic manage to pay 16% more for a car, 21 without the state donation, are signs of a radical change.

In the former world, the production overcapacity of factories pressured the markets to register as much as possible. Then down with the price and km0 and file the cost to the leg to adjust the margins. Everything changed in a few weeks. Factories and closed markets, savings accumulated on current accounts, never before seen public money and rain, layoffs a-go-go. Upon resumption, the lack of components caused the manufacturers to find themselves in an unknown reality: the customers recommended themselves not to have the discount, but a car, and the less fortunate emptied the used car seats. The nervous impulse arrived in an instant at the headquarters of the houses: They could earn more by selling fewer cars. It would be left to explain to the taxpayers what the incentives were for, but we will get there.

Moreover, they could kill not two but three pigeons. Day by day, the Commission still fines producers for sales that exceed a certain limit for CO2 emissions, with an ideological rage that can not be shaken by Covid or by the evidence from Glasgow. So, having to choose what to produce, who could resist prioritizing low-emission cars? The problem is that they cost a lot more than the others. The price analysis shows that the ratio between value and volume performance for hybrid machines, which account for more than a third of sales, is 1.09, while for classical thermals we are 0.85 / 0.88. . This is where the friendly state comes into play and takes out the incentive money to prevent the builders from taking their own to pay the fines. Hats off! But, the debt? Well, another time.

The third pigeon is investment in electrical products and related factories. The leaders know that they are not as necessary as they say, because there will be no stopping for thermobiles. But they must account to financial analysts who respond to humorous and fashionable markets with a horizon of months and not years, and who do not aim to create or preserve industrial value. So they have to be put into the plans, only to restore the balance in the accounts by increasing the first item: the price lists.

In conclusion, the car is a commodity and will remain so. It is only the European industry that leaves the lower part of the population that can spend a little, on used cars or new ones imported from China. Because? This is where it has been pushed for decades by the anti-car party and the trendy and interrupted environmental policy. The unions? They are, as usual, part of the problem.

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